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In this research, I describe a semi-automatic, rapid keystroke injection USB device: The Rubber 
Ducky. This project demonstrates the amount of damage possible – though limited to a Windows 
virtual machine – by sending commands at up to 1000 words per minute [1]. Of concern is, 
unlike other USB delivery methods [2], the Ducky circumnavigates traditional antivirus software 
and other securities by appearing to the computer as a keyboard typing. Damage implications 
carry to medical devices [3] and voting machines [4], with their typically easily accessible, fully 
functional, and input-accepting USB ports. 
A successful attack is measured primarily by amount of content affected (passwords, banking 
information), but may include how stealthily it was carried out (hidden command execution, 
shorter times) and how much evidence was removed (registry artifact deletion). As shown in this 
project, regardless of whether by social engineering, the morbid curiosity of users, or an attacker 
having mere seconds undisturbed with the computer – by allowing the Ducky to run, the game is 
lost. Trade secrets are forfeit; files, held ransom. The attacker may even install a backdoor and 
carry on undetected – for years – as an Advance Persistent Threat [5]. 
 
